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From a trans-European to a trans- 1. 
Eurasian vision of transport corridors
For over a decade, the EU has been promoting a transport 
corridor system reaching from Southeast Europe across 
the Caucasus into Central Asia, called TRACECA, which 
nevertheless does not seem to live up to early expectations. 
At the same time it has been working to develop a set of 
Pan-European corridors or axes through the new member 
states of Central and Eastern Europe into Ukraine, Russia 
and the wider European neighbourhood, but which do not 
extend to Central Asia. 
These  eastern  moves  by  the  EU  now  meet  virtually 
symmetrical western moves coming from Asia, with China 
and  the  Asian  Development  Bank  strongly  supporting 
a set of corridors running through Central Asia under a 
programme  called  CAREC.  This  now  sees  large-scale 
investment in a complex of corridors which are effectively 
changing  the  strategic  transport  map  of  Central  Asia, 
and opening it to external neighbours at all points of the 
compass.  
Most  of  the  existing  road  and  rail  infrastructures  of 
the  region  were  of  course  constructed  in  Soviet  times, 
and a core group of former Soviet states led by Russia 
and  Kazakhstan,  organised  as  the  Eurasian  Economic 
Community  (EurAsEC),  seek  to  renew  the  potential  of 
this network in order to support economic growth of the 
region.
These three sets of transport are not explicitly coordinated. 
For  example  Russia  is  not  a  member  of  the  Asian 
Development  Bank  (ADB);  and  the  EU  and  CAREC 
programmes  seem  to  be  hardly  coordinated  at  all, 
although the EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development) participates in some CAREC projects. 
However,  Kazakhstan,  whose  territory  stretches  one 
third of the way between Berlin and Beijing, could be a 
facilitator  of  coordination  given  the  central  place  of  its 
national transport policy choices.
The EU seems to remain focused on its wider European 
neighbourhood,  with  Central  Asia  perceived  by  some 
as its outer periphery. This paper explores the case for 
opening  this  view  towards  a  coherent  trans-Eurasian 
transport strategy with particular reference to the case of 
Central Asia. This would imply an updating and revision of 
the present EU policies.
It is already clear that all four major economic powers of 
the Eurasian land mass – the EU, Russia, China and India 
– have serious interests here. Each of these four major 
economies are concerned with the logistics for trade flows 
between each other, first of all in diagonal routes that can 
go around Central Asia:
west-north (EU-Russia, by land), north-east (Russia- •	
China  by  land),  west-south  (EU-India  by  land  and 
sea),  south-east  (India-China  by  sea),  west-south-
east (EU-China by sea)
However  there  are  vertical  and  horizontal  connections 
running through Central Asia, for example:
west-east (EU-Central Asia-China) •	
north-south (Russia-Central Asia-India) •	
... and also some diagonal routes passing through Central 
Asia:
north-east to south-west (West China to the Middle  •	
East)
north-west to south-east (Northern Europe to India) •	
Figure 1. Schematic map of EurAsian transport corridors
Abstract
There is at present an overlapping but inadequately coordinated combination of strategic trans-continental transport 
corridors or axes stretching across the Eurasian landmass, centred on or around Central Asia. There are three 
such initiatives - from the EU, China and the Asian Development Bank, and the Eurasian Economic Community. 
This  paper  reviews  these  several  strategic  transport  maps,  and  makes  proposals  for  their  coordination  and 
rationalisation. So far the EU Central Asia strategy has not paid much attention to these questions. However the 
EU’s own initiatives (the Pan-European Axes and the TRACECA programme) are in need of updating and revision 
to take into account major investments being made by other parties. In particular the case is made for a ‘Central 
Eurasian Corridor’ for rail and road that would reach from Central Europe across Ukraine and Southern Russia 
into West Kazakhstan, and thence to the East Kazakh border with China, thus joining up with and completing the 
West China-West Europe corridor promoted by the Asian Development Bank. There should also be a North-South 
corridor that would cross over this Central Eurasian Corridor in West Kazakhstan and lead south to the Middle East 
and South Asia. These adaptations of existing plans could become an exemplary case of cooperation between 
Central Asia and all the major economic powers of the Eurasian landmass.  Optimisation of Central Asian and Eurasian Land Transport Corridors - Michael Emerson & Evgeny Vinokurov    5
These axes are presented in a deliberately stylized map in 
Figure 1, which may serve to prompt reflection on the case 
for a concerted trans-Eurasian transport corridor strategy. 
Alternatively one can look at the detailed transport planning 
maps of the EU (Maps 1 and 2), CAREC (Map 3) and 
EurAsEC (Maps 4 and 5), which taken together become 
a spaghetti bowl of complex and overlapping connections 
that the mind cannot easily grasp.  
The transit and transport potential of the  2. 
trans-Eurasian land routes
At  present  practically  all  (99%)  of  the  goods  traded 
between the EU and the Asian Pacific region are being 
shipped by sea.1 In 2007, 17.7 million containers (of 20-
foot equivalent units – or TEUs) were transported from 
Asia to Europe, and 10 million TEUs from Europe to Asia. 
The  difference  of  7.7  million  TEUs  represents  empty 
containers returning to their point of origin. According to 
the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific  (ESCAP),  by  2015  containerised  transportation 
from Asia to Europe and from Europe to Asia may reach 
26.1 million TEUs and 17.7 million TEUs, respectively. But 
the Suez Canal is expected soon to reach its maximum 
capacity  for  container  vessels,  so  the  opportunities  for 
land routes to gain traffic may grow. 
Overland  containerised  shipments  from  China  enter 
Kazakhstan  via  the  Dostyk-Alashankou  border-crossing 
point. In 2008, the daily throughput at Dostyk-Alashankou 
was 520-550 rail cars. Most trains consist of 48-50 rail 
cars,  including  container  wagons.  It  is  estimated  that 
Dostyk  could  transship2  about  306,000  TEUs  annually. 
However in 2007, according to Kaztransservice, the official 
container operator, Dostyk transshipped 109.7 thousand 
TEUs, albeit an increase on 2006 of 37%.3
Kaztransservice forecasts that by 2015 the trans-shipment 
of containers at Dostyk’s railway terminal could increase 
to 730,000 TEUs (see Figure 2), although this is more 
optimistic than the forecast of UN ESCAP. Nevertheless, 
there  is  a  consensus  that  trans-shipment  volumes  will 
grow considerably in the medium term, which justifies the 
development of overland transport systems. 
While southern and eastern China will always prefer sea 
and air transportation routes in its trade with the EU and 
even to some degree with the CIS countries, the most 
pertinent source for expanding shipments through land 
corridors is Western China, a home to 150 million people 
and rapidly expanding industry. Commodities that can be 
transported by road and rail from China to Kazakhstan 
and  Russia  include:  chemicals  (hazardous),  foodstuffs 
(perishable), electric instruments; stereo, video and audio 
systems;  mobile  communications  equipment;  TV  sets; 
electric cables; furniture; clothes and shoes; cosmetics.
The following commodities can be considered as possible 
backhaul road transport cargoes moving from Europe to 
China: industrial and agricultural equipment; metals (high-
value non-ferrous metal goods, higher-purity metals and 
other high-value goods which are usually purchased in 
small quantities); integrated circuits; various fine chemical 
products and polymers; consumer goods and foodstuffs 
(e.g. meat).
Certain cargoes, such as bearings, are not suitable for sea 
transportation without specialised and costly packaging to 
protect them from the sea air.
Thus, there are several niche markets for the China-EU 
traffic  through  northern  Eurasian  land  corridors,  with 
railway  transportation  being  able  to  offer  competitive 
tariffs and times of delivery for an intermediate category of 
high value and low weight goods (the highest value/lowest 
weight goods will be sent by air freight).  
Figure 2. Transshipment of containers at Dostyk 
(thousand TEUs)
Source: Forecast by Kaztransservice.
The vast transit potential of land routes through northern 
Eurasia is, at present, very much underused. The current 
transit  cargo  flows  from  and  to  non-CIS  countries  are 
negligible  compared  with  transit  from  and  through 
EurAsEC countries to third countries. 
Key issues affecting Eurasian inter- 3. 
continental cargo transit 
The huge preponderance of sea transit routes between 
China and Europe reflect basic competitive conditions.
Cheaper  tariffs.  International  shipping  companies  with 
extensive  and  cost-efficient  fleets  at  their  disposal  can 
keep  their  port  charges  and  freight  rates  low.  In  many 
cases,  the  shipping  cost  is  the  main  consideration  for 
consignors as they strive to minimise the transportation 
component of the price of commodities in order to keep 
them competitive in the destination country. Following the 
recent huge crisis-related drop in the Baltic Dry Index, 
which is used in pricing raw material ocean freight rates 
(oil, metals, grains, etc.), the tariffs charged by shipping 
companies, at least in the near future, will be even more 
competitive than other modes of transport. 
However, the above appears to be true only for east–west 
transit.  For  north-south  traffic,  which  is  the  other  main 
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direction for transit through EurAsEC countries, analysts 
believe that overland transportation costs can compete 
with sea freight. According to estimates, it costs $3,500 to 
deliver one tonne of cargo from Germany to India through 
the  Suez  Canal,  and  takes  40  days.  Container  freight 
along  the  alternative  north-south  transport  corridor  will 
cost $2,500 and take 15-20 days.
Customer  service  and  compliance  with  international 
quality standards. In addition to their competitive rates, 
sea shipping companies offer a high standard of service, 
including cargo tracking, sophisticated logistics networks 
and  guarantees  of  on-time  and  secure  delivery.  They 
use state-of-the-art technology, offer discounts to regular 
customers, etc. 
By comparison, the land routes suffer from both physical 
and non-physical disadvantages. Physical barriers include 
the obsolescence and shortages of rail cars, containers and 
locomotives; the non-compliance of existing infrastructure 
and technology with international quality standards (route 
handling capacities, etc.); inadequate processing capacity 









Hamburg 1.475 2.500 2.650 26
Kotka 1.620 2.700 2.800 32
Tallin 1.925 3.240 3.415 32
Riga 1.925 3.300 3.475 32
Klaipeda 1.925 3.300 3.475 32
Novorossiysk 2.025 3.750 3.875 32
St. Petersburg 1.980 3.170 3.270 32
Vladivostok 1.350 1.950 1.950 10
These  ocean  freign  rates  can  be  compared  with  the  rail  freight  rates  offered  to  the  same 
company. Transportation is by TSR; destination Moscow
Destination USD/container CNY Container Delivery time
20’ 
DC
40’DC 40’HC 20’DC 40’DC 40’HC
Moscow 3.585 6.510 6.510 28.680 52.080 52.080 15
The insurance surcharge is $300-550 per container (depending on the customs code of the 
commodity). These tables show that sea shipping costs are around 50% lower than rail freight. 
For 20-foot and 40-foot containers, respectively.














Via Kazakhstan and Russia 9,200 4 2
Shenzhen (China)
Via Mongolia and Russia  11,040 4 2
Via Kazakhstan and Russia 10,300 4 2
Tumannaya River
Via China, Mongolia and Russia 8,900 4 2
Via China, Kazakhstan and Russia 9,900 4 2
Via China   (Manchuria) and Russia 9,000 3 2
Via Russia 10,300 2 1
Nakhodka 
(Russia)
Via Russia 10,300 2 1
Rajin (North 
Korea)
Via China   (Manchuria) and Russia 8,900 4 2
Via Russia 10,300 3 1
Pusan (South 
Korea)
Via North Korea and Russia 11,600 4 2
Via North Korea, China, Mongolia and Russia 10,780 6 2
Table 1. Physical and non-physical barriers to trade
Source: UN ESCAP (1996) Trans-Asian Railway Route Requirements: Feasibility Study on 
Connecting the Rail Networks of China, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, the Russian Federation and the 
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and  communications  networks  and  motorway  service 
facilities; different rail gauges – throughout the CIS, the 
1,520-mm gauge is used, whereas in Europe and Asia 
(China,  Iran,  Southeast Asia,  etc.)  the  gauge  is  1,435 
mm.  This  poses  additional  problems  which  compound 
the  shortage  of  transshipment  centres  and  insufficient 
handling capacity at border-crossing points (see Table 1); 
insufficient capacity for cargo handling, consolidation and 
deconsolidation.4 Non-physical barriers are largely man-
made non-technical barriers to trade, such as protracted 
customs  procedures  at  border-crossing  points,  which 
significantly increase waiting times for vehicles and rolling 
stock; random inspections, often requiring sealed transit 
containers to be opened; non-harmonised transit tariffs 
across the CIS; and migration rules determining the time 
drivers are allowed to stay in EurAsEC differ from country 
to country. 
But  time  advantage.  However,  overland  transit  has  an 
important  competitive  advantage  –  it  reduces  delivery 
times. The shortest cargo delivery time from eastern China 
and other southeast Asian countries to western Europe by 
rail or road is 2-2.5 times shorter than sea shipment via the 
Suez Canal. This advantage is less apparent, however, 
where  delivery  time  is  calculated  for  large  shipments. 
For example, the average container capacity of vessels 
working on Asia-Europe routes increased to 7,100 TEUs 
by  2007.  According  to  Kazakhstan  Temir  Zholy  (the 
national railway company), in 2007, an average container 
train was able to carry up to 270 TEUs. 
Shorter delivery time is also a critical factor for certain 
cargoes  (perishable  goods  or  urgent  door-to-door 
shipments).  In  addition,  faster  delivery  means  quicker 
receipt of cash from the bank and shortened transaction 
times. Therefore, the time factor is a valuable competitive 
advantage  that  overland  routes  can  offer  for  certain 
commodities, customers, and of course for land-locked 
regions  such  as  China’s  rapidly  developing  Xinjiang 
Uigur Autonomous Region (XUAR), which has no viable 
alternative to rail and road transit. 
Existing and emerging international  4. 
transport corridors in the region
EurAsEC  initiatives.  All  of  the  region’s  rail  and  road 
transport infrastructure date back to the fully integrated 
networks of the Soviet Union. In the post-Soviet period 
there have been three overlapping political institutions and 
cooperation arrangements that are relevant to transport 
policy: the CIS (all former Soviet republics except the Baltic 
states), the EurAsian Economic Community (EurAsEC – 
with  Russia  and  Kazakhstan  as  the  main  drivers,  plus 
Belarus,  Kyrgyzstan  and  Tajikistan),  and  the  customs 
union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. However the 
main policy forum for transport policy is the EurAsEC. 
Founded  in  2000,  EurAsEC  perceives  integration  and 
coordination  of  its  members’  transport  systems  as  one 
of its top priorities, as anchored in the Charter. This task 
is reflected in the agenda of such bodies as the Council 
of Transport Policy and regular meetings at the levels of 
Heads of State and respective ministers. In particular, the 
organisation  strives  to  a)  harmonise  national  transport 
legislation (the respective set of documents was adopted in 
2003); b) develop EurAsEC transport corridors; c) remove 
non-physical barriers; and, lately, d) weave the transport 
policy into the development of the Belarus-Kazakhstan-
Russia Customs Union, to be created in 2010 and be fully 
operational by 2011. 
For the EurAsEC members, whose mutual trade turnover 
and, accordingly, cargo transportation have been rapidly 
increasing recently (by 2020, their cargo transportation 
may total 490 million tonnes, a four-fold increase compared 
with  2000),  the  development  of  transport  infrastructure 
is vital in sustaining the expansion of mutual trade and 
economic integration. The transit potential of EurAsEC is 
estimated at around 220 million tonnes. In order to be able 
to handle these volumes of cargo, the region’s existing 
transport  infrastructure  needs  to  be  modernised  and, 
most importantly, efficiently linked to both the Chinese and 
European transport networks.  
EU initiatives. The EU has promoted two initiatives to 
extend  its  transport  networks  into  neighbouring  states 
to its north and east: the Pan-European corridors and/or 
axes extending north and north-east into Belarus, Ukraine 
and Russia, and the Traceca network extending to the 
south-east through the Caucasus into Central Asia. 
Pan-European  corridors.  The  origins  of  these 
international  transport  corridors  can  be  traced  back  to 
the  1980–1990s,  when  Western  European  countries 
identified  an  urgent  need  to  improve  the  EU’s  internal 
and external links in response to a rapid growth in traffic. 
In 1994, following the First and Second Pan-European 
Conferences  on  Transport,  ten  major  transport  routes, 
the  ‘Crete  corridors’,  were  identified.  These  corridors 
were to provide optimal transport links between Western 
European  countries,  the  Baltics,  the  European  part  of 
the CIS (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Minsk, Lviv, Kiev), the 
Black Sea ports (Odessa, Constanta, Varna) and Turkey 
(Istanbul). Of the ten corridors the most relevant in the 
present context are:
II.  Berlin – Warsaw – Minsk – Moscow – Nizhny 
Novgorod
III. Berlin – Dresden – Wrocław – Lviv – Kiev
IV. Berlin / Nuremberg – Prague – Budapest – Constanta 
/ Thessaloniki / Istanbul
IX. Helsinki – St. Petersburg – Moscow – Pskov – Kiev – 
Chişinău – Bucharest – Dimitrovgrad – Alexandroupolis.
Of  special  interest  in  the  present  context  is  the  Pan-
European Transport Corridor II which extends 1,830 km 
from Berlin to Nizhny Novgorod via Warsaw, Minsk and 
Moscow. It will be fully operational by 2010. Presently, 
the  ‘East  Wind’  container  rail  service  links  Berlin  with 
Moscow. The Pan-European Corridor II is important not 
only to Russia and Belarus, but also to other EurAsEC 
countries  involved  in  cargo  transit  between  the  Asia 
Pacific region and Western Europe. Using this corridor, 
Kazakhstan  and  Russia  can  offer  transport  services  in 
the China-West Europe direction for Japan, South Korea, 8  EUCAM Working Paper No. 7
Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and others as 
well as China. For many years, shipments in this direction 
have been made along the Moscow – Yekaterinburg – 
Omsk  –  Novosibirsk  –  Irkutsk  transport  corridor,  which 
provides access to the ports of Nakhodka and Vanino and 
to China via Zabaikalsk, Grodekovo and Naushki. With 
the  opening  of  the  Druzhba-Alashankou  Sino-Kazakh 
railway  border  crossing  point  in  1992,  journeys  in  this 
direction were shortened: for example, the journey from 
Moscow to the port of Lianyungang (China) is now 670 
km  shorter,  and  from  Moscow  to  Hong  Kong  860  km 
shorter than the previous route via Naushki. In addition, 
this route can be used for shipments from Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to Moscow and 
beyond through the Pan-European Corridor II to Europe. 
Cargoes include cotton, the staple export commodity of 
these countries, and oil from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan.
The EU has further developed its transport planning in the 
context of its recent enlargement in 2005 and 2007 and its 
European Neighbourhood Policy. The enlargement process 
in particular prompted the EU to commission a High Level 
Group, chaired by Loyola de Palacio, to consider how the 
Trans-European Transport Axes internal to the EU should 
be extended also into neighbouring countries. This group 
adopted a reshaped map of corridors or axes, identifying 
two of relevance in the present context: 
Central Axis, going from the EU through Ukraine and  o 
across southern Russia, with one branch reaching up 
to Chelyabinsk at the south of the Ural region, and 
another one to Astrakhan at the north of the Caspian 
Sea, but without mention of Central Asia, and the
South Eastern Axis through to Turkey, with one branch  o 
extending  to  the  Caucasus  as  part  of  the  Traceca 
programme,  and  another  one  down  south  to  the 
Middle East and Egypt.
The whole set of trans-European corridors and axes is 
estimated to have cost €126 billion up to 2007, and to cost 
a further €150 billion until 2013, and a further €120 billion 
up until 2020, with substantial funding coming from the 
European Investment Bank.5 Most of this funding goes to 
investments within the EU, but the EIB now has a new 
mandate to invest in Central Asia together with its longer-
standing mandates to operate in Russia and Ukraine. 
The 2005 report of the Palacio Group report has more 
recently  been  updated  by  the  Commission  in  2007 
and  2008.6  From  these  documents  it  seems  that  the 
Commission continues to view the relevant map as that 
which  covers  the  EU’s  neighbouring  states  (as  in  the 
European  Neighbourhood  Policy  plus  Russia),  with  no 
references to trans-continental trade routes to China and 
the Asia Pacific region. 
TRACECA. The  “Transport  Corridor  Europe-Caucasus-
Asia” programme was initiated by a multilateral agreement 
signed in 1998 between the EU and 14 other states as 
comprehensive road, rail and sea transport corridors to link 
the EU through Southeast Europe to the South Caucasus 
and  on  into  Central  Asia.  The  TRACECA  programme 
consists  of  a  large  number  of  technical  assistance 
projects with some investment financing spread across a 
map of priority routes. There is a permanent secretariat of 
TRACECA in Baku since 2001, which has a coordinating 
role. The political premises of TRACECA were that the 
states of the Caucasus and Central Asia would be open 
to cooperative transport strategies, and that it would be 
good to diversify away from the Moscow-centric routes of 
the Soviet Union (TRACECA routes do not pass through 
Russia). However the European Commission seems aware 
of weaknesses in the TRACECA programme, and a recent 
policy document declares that “the institutional and policy 
dimensions of TRACECA need to be strengthened and 
modernised, in particular to address in an effective manner 
both corridor development and overall policy discussion”.7 
In addition the transport map of Central Asia is now being 
substantially  changed  by  the  major  investments  of  the 
CAREC  programme,  with  heavy  investments  in  routes 
across Kazakhstan which exit towards Europe above the 
Caspian Sea. 
CAREC.  Since  1997  the  Asian  Development  Bank 
has,  with  strong  Chinese  support,  been  promoting  the 
Central Asia Regional Economic programme (CAREC), 
which brings together four Central Asian states8 together 
with  Afghanistan,  Azerbaijan,  China  and  Mongolia.  In 
November 2008 they announced a $6.7 billion programme 
of investments in major transport projects in the region, 
including  a  West  China-West  Europe  corridor,  which 
crosses Kazakhstan with key road and rail routes, to which 
the World Bank is contributing its biggest ever loan of $2 
billion. The complete set of corridors is listed below:
Europe-East  Asia,  from  China  across  to  west  1. 
Kazakhstan, with over $3 billion of funding from ADB, 
World Bank, EBRD and IsDB (Islamic Development 
Bank) for 2,715 km of roads in Kazakhstan 
Mediterranean-East Asia, road and rail networks from  2. 
China into Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, 
and  then  across  the  Caspian  Sea  into  the  South 
Caucasus and Black Sea, with support from the same 
IFIs
Russia-Middle  East  and  South  Asia,  with  a  north- 3. 
south route running from Siberia across all Central 
Asian states into Afghanistan and Iran
Russia-East Asia  (without  passage  through  Central  4. 
Asia)
East  Asia-Middle  East  and  South  Asia,  with  road  5. 
connection from China into Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, 
and then on into Afghanistan and Pakistan
Europe-Middle East and South Asia, with road and rail  6. 
networks from west Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to be 
extended into Afghanistan.9
From this it is evident that the Asian Development Bank 
through its CAREC programme is orchestrating investment 
by  itself  and  other  IFIs  in  transport  corridors  crossing 
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east and west. 
With  the  European  Investment  Bank  now  mandated 
to operate in Central Asia there is an evident case for 
coordination between the EU and CAREC programmes. 
TRACECA  can  provide  valuable  grant-funded  technical 
assistance, which could be managed so as to complement 
the major loan-funded investment projects of the IFIs. 
Discussion of priorities 5. 
Railway  corridors.  Since  rail  is  the  most  economical 
mode  for  inter-continental  land  cargo  traffic,  the  main 
rail cargo traffic routes are now discussed in more detail. 
These rely heavily on the extensive railway network of the 
former Soviet Union. 
The Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR) has for decades been 
the principal railway link between European Russia and 
its industrial regions to the east (Siberia, the Urals, etc.). 
The TSR is 9,288 km long; it was completed in 1903 and 
fully electrified by 2002. It has a number of branch lines 
in  its  far  eastern  section  which  link  to  Chinese,  North 
Korean and Mongolian railways, Central Asian railways 
and Europe (to Western European railways via Belarus). 
Currently, the TSR is technically capable of carrying 250-
300 thousand TEUs of international transit cargoes per 
annum. Once the modernisation of the TSR is complete, 
and if the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) railway is used, this 
figure may increase to 1 million TEUs per annum. Russian 
Railways has pledged to invest about 50 billion roubles 
($1.5 billion10) in the modernisation of the TSR up to 2015, 
primarily to allow it to handle special container traffic.
The Northern Trans-Asian corridor is viewed as the second-
most developed corridor after the TSR, and is sometimes 
referred to as the “second Eurasian overland bridge”. It 
runs  from  Lianyungang  through  central  and  northwest 
China, Kazakhstan and Russia to Western Europe. The 
distance from Lianyungang to Rotterdam is 10,900 km. 
The  corridor  is  being  developed  on  an  ongoing  basis. 
The economics of this corridor might be more favourable 
than the TSR’s, since it is 2,500 km shorter. After 1992 
the Chinese section of this railway (some 4,150 km) was 
partially modernised. To date, 89% of its total length is 
double  tracked,  and  29%  of  the  line  is  electrified.  It  is 
expected that, with the industrial development of Western 
China, this route will be made double track along its entire 
length, and electrification will be extended. 
However, China and Kazakhstan use different gauges – 
1,435 mm and 1,520 mm, respectively. This poses a major 
problem  for  the  development  of  freight  transportation, 
since containerised cargoes have to be reloaded by crane. 
At present, the Dostyk rail freight terminal in Kazakhstan, 
at  the  Sino-Kazakh  border,  is  capable  of  handling  a 
maximum  of  620  rail  cars  per  day.  Until  recently,  the 
maximum  capacity  barely  exceeded  500-550  rail  cars 
per day. The depot’s current throughput is 12 train pairs 
per  day  on  the  Chinese  narrow-gauge  line.  According 
to preliminary estimates, the depot handled a total of 14 
million tonnes of scheduled cargo in 2008. New handling 
terminals are now being constructed and eight of them are 
already complete, and as already indicated this border-
crossing point should become capable of handling over 
300,000 TEUs annually.
The  Central  Trans-Asian  corridor  runs  from  the  Sino-
Kazakh border via Dostyk to Almaty to Volgograd in Russia 
and on to Ukraine (Donetsk-Kiev).11 This is the shortest 
route from Asia to Central Europe. It is double-track and 
electrified within the former Soviet Union and it provides 
access to Poland, Slovakia  and  Hungary. This corridor 
is  relatively  underdeveloped  now.  However  we  would 
stress a number of important advantages of developing 
this connection and firmly placing it on the trans-Eurasian 
transport map. 
First, as already mentioned, this is the shortest route  o 
from  Asia  to  Central  Europe.  Thus,  it  could  offer 
competitive terms to shippers whose primary concern 
is speed of delivery. 
Second, it crosses developed regions of Russia and  o 
Ukraine,  which  would  benefit  from  this  connection. 
In  particular,  these  regions,  together  with  Northern 
Kazakhstan,  are  major  agricultural  producers  (one 
of the largest grain-producing regions in the world), 
and this may become a major specialisation for the 
corridor. 
Third, this corridor connects to the prospective North- o 
South  route  along  the  eastern  Caspian  shore  (at 
Atyrau-Makat), which would run through Kazakhstan-
Turkmenistan-Iran aiming to connect to the Middle East 
and also targeting agricultural cargo and metals. 
For these reasons the EU should consider including a link 
to this route in a revision of the Pan-European corridor and 
TRACECA maps. In fact this corridor would run roughly 
half  way  between  the  northern  Pan-European  corridor 
that extends from Moscow to the Urals and the southern 
TRACECA corridor that runs through the South Caucasus 
and across the Caspian Sea. To make this corridor fully 
operational and efficient in Kazakhstan, there would have 
to be an upgrade of the relatively short connection between 
Shalkar  and  Makat  in  West  Kazakhstan  (i.e.  between 
corridors 1b/6b,c and 6a in CAREC’s terminology). The 
development of the corridor requires further technical and 
economic study. With these modifications we could call 
this the ‘Central Eurasian Corridor’.
A  North-South  Eurasian  corridor  (or  corridors)  is  also 
justified by the economic interests of Central Asian states 
and Russia to get better access to the Middle East and 
South Asia and the Indian Ocean, and for example for 
India to get better access to Central Asian and Russian 
markets.  For  this  purpose  there  could  be  a  cross-over 
junction  with  the  Central  Eurasian  Corridor  in  West 
Kazakhstan. In fact there are already investments being 
made by Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran to develop 
this North-South railroad route, which is officially called 
Uzen  (Kaz.)  –  Kyzylkaya-Bereket-Etrek  (Turkm.)  – 
Gorgan (Iran) project. Turkmenistan has already built 150 
km of the planned 477 km of rail track, with the rest to be 
completed by December 2011. There could be a roughly 
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Turkmenbashi – Tehran.  
The Southern Trans-Asian corridor is also a potentially 
useful route. It also starts from Lianyungang, and passes 
through Dostyk, Almaty, Tashkent, Iran and Turkey before 
reaching  the  Mediterranean  and  Black  Sea  ports.  But 
this railway also has several problems. First, the different 
gauges require transshipment at two points. The Iranian 
part (2,010 km) is single track and not electrified. In Turkey, 
trains have to cross Lake Van by ferry. Along the branch 
lines  to  Istanbul  (i.e.  the  Mediterranean)  and  Samsun 
(Black Sea), only 46% of the railway is electrified, and only 
10% is double track.
TRACECA Trans-Caspian corridor. This project includes 
the  Dostyk  –  Tashkent  – Ashgabad  –  Turkmenbashi  – 
Baku – Tbilisi – Poti route with sea ferry connections to 
Odessa, Varna, Constanta and Istanbul. Despite the EU’s 
enthusiasm for this project at an early stage, it has failed 
to achieve its design capacity during the 14 years since its 
originating documents were signed. 
Parties  to  TRACECA  signed  a  number  of  documents 
relating to certain benefits and reduced tariffs, e.g. a 50% 
discount on rail freight and ferry transportation of empty 
wagons. In addition, taxes and fees on transit cargoes 
were abolished, and measures were taken at national level 
to enhance the safety of passengers, cargoes, carriers 
and vehicles. However, despite all these measures, the 
economic  efficiency  of  this  route  is  questionable.  The 
tariffs charged by Russian railways for transporting grain, 
cotton and containers are 1.7 times lower than those of 
the TRACECA route. In addition, transportation via Russia 
gives 1.8-fold journey time advantage. Cargo is shipped 
mainly  from  west  to  east,  with  mostly  empty  wagons 
travelling in the opposite direction. This has a negative 
effect on the efficiency of Caspian and Black Sea ferry 
lines.
At the moment, some sections of the TRACECA route are 
used to transport oil and oil products from Turkmenistan, 
cotton and grain from Uzbekistan, etc. At the port of Poti, 
a  grain  terminal  with  an  annual  capacity  of  1.5  million 
tonnes, a container terminal with an annual capacity of 
200 thousand TEUs, and large storage facilities are all 
under construction. The potential capacity of the Batumi–
Poti–Ilyichevsk ferry line is estimated to be 15-20 million 
tonnes per annum. However, its annual throughput at the 
moment is no higher than 0.9 million tonnes (using two 
ferries). The Baku–Turkmenbashi ferry line handles up to 
2 million tonnes annually (five ferries).12
Automobile  corridors.  There  are  two  main  projects 
currently under development. 
The West Europe-West China project (involving EBRD, 
ADB,  World  Bank,  IDB,  and  others)  is  8,455  km  long, 
and largely parallels the Central Eurasian Corridor for rail 
discussed above. About one-quarter of the highway will 
be laid in Kazakhstan, and will allow transit not only to 
Russia and China, but also to South Asian countries via 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. A consortium of multilateral 
development banks approved massive loans to build the 
Kazakhstan part of this corridor. This consortium includes 
the World Bank ($2.13 billion), ADB ($340 million), EBRD 
($180 million) and IDB ($170 million13). The total cost of 
the Kazakhstani part of Western Europe-Western China 
road and rail routes amounts to $5.32 billion ($2.8 billion 
of bank loans and $2.5 billion of state financing). 
Since  this  road  route  would  largely  parallel  the  rail 
route  mentioned,  with  links  into  southern  Russia  along 
the  Astrakhan-Volgograd-Rostov  line,  there  would  be 
synergies to be obtained by giving this road route also 
Pan-European corridor status.  
NELTI (New Eurasian Land Transport Initiative) will facilitate 
the movement of cargo to the CIS and the EU along the 
Beijing–Urumqi–Bakhty–Astana–Moscow–Riga–Vilnius–
Warsaw–Berlin–Brussels route. This project is expected to 
increase cargo transit along the international motorways of 
Kazakhstan and Russia to 5.2 million tonnes per annum. 
The NELTI is receiving wide media coverage. We believe, 
however, that its significance may be overestimated for 
the following reasons. 
There are significant obstacles to the development of road 
transit through Russia and Kazakhstan. Firstly, it is very 
expensive for vehicle owners to operate in these countries 
because of the poor state of road surfaces and the road 
network in general. For a journey to be profitable, a truck 
must  be  able  to  cover  up  to  1,000  km  during  daylight 
hours. If a European carrier is contracted to undertake 
a  transit  shipment,  special  tracking  systems  will  not 
allow it to travel at night for safety reasons. In addition 
road transport is extremely inefficient in these countries; 
the  fleet  consists  mainly  of  old  and  obsolete  vehicles, 
which  do  not  meet  specific  requirements  for  cargo  or 
other operations; logistics systems are not sophisticated 
enough to coordinate multi-modal shipments efficiently; 
and cargo handling centres on long-distance routes lack 
the technology to handle large vehicles. In addition, there 
is no spot freight system in place that could help fill empty 
vehicles. For these reasons, while automobile corridors 
are important for inter-state traffic, railway corridors will 
remain  more  competitive  for  trans-continental  cargo 
transit. 
Multi-model  corridors.  The  multi-modal  North-South 
transport  corridor  which  links  northwest  Europe  and 
Scandinavia with Central Asia and the Persian Gulf has 
also  become  much  more  important  as  a  result  of  the 
rapidly expanding trade between Europe and India. This 
route relies on the extensive transport networks of Russia, 
Iran, Kazakhstan and other countries. The corridor running 
from the port of Bombay to St. Petersburg is 7,200 km long. 
In the Caspian region, several routes use waterways: the 
trans-Caspian sea route, the inland Caspian-Volga-Baltic 
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Black  Sea,  connecting  with  a  number  of  railways  and 
motorways.
6. Conclusions 
Trans-continental EurAsian land corridors will never  1. 
be in the same league as sea transportation for trade 
between the EU and China and the rest of the Asia 
Pacific  region.  There  are  however  several  niche 
markets  for  this  trans-continental  traffic  through 
Eurasian land corridors, with railway transportation 
able to offer competitive tariffs and times of delivery 
for  the  high-value  and  low-weight  categories  of 
goods.  The  transit  volume  could,  for  example, 
potentially be raised from the current 1% of total EU-
China trade flows to maybe 5-10%. In addition these 
corridors will serve the expanding trade of Russia, 
Kazakhstan and other Central Asia states with the 
EU, China, and South Asia. 
The  actual  and  potential  transport  corridors  2. 
passing through Central Asia are currently subject 
to  three  sets  of  initiatives,  those  of  the  Eurasian 
Economic  Community  (EurAsEC)  led  by  Russia 
and Kazakhstan, China and the Asian Development 
Bank through its CAREC programme, and the EU 
through  its  promotion  of  Pan-European Axes  and 
the TRACECA programme. These are far from fully 
coordinated. The biggest new investments in Central 
Asian transport corridors are now being led by the 
ADB with the support of other major IFIs, which are 
effectively  changing  the  transport  map  of  Central 
Asia, prompting the need to review the coherence of 
these multiple programmes.
The  most  substantial  transit  routes  for  cargo  3. 
between Europe and Asia are the Russian Trans-
Siberian  Railway  and  the  Northern  Trans-Asian 
corridor through China, Kazakhstan and European 
Russia.  This  second  route  has  been  subject  to 
important modernisation investments in China, and 
is significantly shorter than the Trans-Siberian route, 
for  example  2,500  km  shorter  for  trade  moving 
from  Rotterdam  to  the  Chinese  coastal  port  of 
Lianyungang. However, while shorter, this route is 
not yet optimal, since it still takes a route that goes 
too far north for optimal logistics between the EU 
and Central Asia and the Asia Pacific region, and the 
route via Moscow is also congested. 
We  therefore  see  advantages  in  a  route  that  we  4. 
might call the ‘Central Eurasian Corridor’, running 
from the Chinese-Kazakh border across Kazakhstan 
along  the  CAREC  route  called  West  China-West 
Europe, but with a branch then across the northern 
coast of the Caspian sea through Southern Russia 
(Astrakhan-Volgograd)  and  Ukraine  (Donetsk-
Kiev) and into Central Europe as the shortest land 
route from Asia to the EU. This links to the need 
for  updating  and  optimising  the  EU’s  transport 
strategies.  The  Pan-European  Central  Axis  goes 
across Ukraine, southern Russia and on to the Urals, 
but without at present a link into west Kazakhstan. 
This  Pan-European  Central Axis  should  therefore 
be amended or complemented with the proposed 
“Central  Eurasian  Corridor”.  The  route  crosses 
developed  regions  of  Russia  and  Ukraine,  which 
would  benefit  from  this  connection.  In  particular, 
these regions, together with Northern Kazakhstan, 
are  major  agricultural  producers.  This  rail  route 
is  paralleled  by  roads,  and  an  upgrading  of  both 
together would offer synergies. 
Also, this East-West corridor could cross over and  5. 
be coordinated with a prospective North-South route 
along the Eastern Caspian shore (at Atyrau-Makat), 
which would run through Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-
Iran aiming to connect to the Middle East and also 
targeting  agricultural  cargo  and  metals.  To  make 
these  axes  fully  operational  and  most  efficient, 
some relatively short rail and road links need to be 
upgraded  in  west  Kazakhstan  (specified  above). 
There are other north-south routes in the CAREC 
plans that transit Afghanistan and Pakistan. These 
routes are also of importance both in times of war as 
now, and peace as and when this region can return 
to normal economic development. 
These  developments  would  mean  revision  of  the  6. 
EU’s present transport maps. The Traceca map was 
originally  traced  to  avoid  Russia  by  crossing  the 
Caucasus and the Caspian Sea, which is consistent 
with  the  more  recent  Southern  Corridor  plan  for 
energy supplies to Europe. On the other hand the 
EU’s  Pan-European  axes  are  now  extending  in 
any case across Russia to the north. The anomaly 
in the present situation is that the optimal Trans-
Eurasian connection is not being made. The new 
CAREC  corridors  crossing  Central Asia  lead  into 
West Europe in the middle between the Southern 
Traceca route and the Northern Pan-European axis, 
and missing both of them.
On the other hand, within Central Asia there could  7. 
be useful coordination between the TRACECA and 
CAREC, since TRACECA’s grant-funded technical 
assistance  projects  could  usefully  complement 
CAREC’s  loan  funding  of  investment.  The  case 
for  this  is  boosted  by  the  fact  that  the  European 
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Central Asia as well as Russia and Ukraine. The 
opportunity  is  thus  ripe  for  the  EU  to  engage  in 
consultations with the major IFIs involved in Central 
Asia, first of all the ADB, World Bank, ERBD, and 
IsDB, with a view to optimising the coordination of 
these  transport  strategies.  Their  financial  means 
can be supplemented by local regional and national 
development  banks,  including  the  Eurasian 
Development  Bank  (EDB),  Vnesheconombank 
(VED)  and  the  Development  Bank  of  Kazakhstan 
(DBK). 
Non-physical barriers to the efficient development  8. 
and  utilisation  of  trans-Eurasian  corridors  are  at 
least as important as the insufficiency of physical 
infrastructure. They include ‘man-made’ impediments 
such as protracted customs procedures at border-
crossing points; random inspections, often requiring 
sealed  transit  containers  to  be  opened;  non-
harmonised  transit  tariffs,  migration  rules  and  the 
like.  EU  technical  assistance  can  be  of  value  in 
overcoming the existing non-physical bottlenecks.
Finally,  the  pursuit  of  technical  improvements  in  9. 
the  coordination  of  transport  strategies  discussed 
here,  involving  the  EU,  Central Asia,  Russia  and 
China, would be an example of cooperation within 
the  emerging  paradigm  of  inter-continental  multi-
polarity. The EU and Russia are trying to improve 
their strategic partnership, and the EU and China 
seek to do so as well, as also is the case of the 
EU and India. The transport nexus of the Eurasian 
landmass is one of the most propitious fields in which 
these major actors might work together in harmony 
in concrete terms.
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